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SYNOPSIS: In the Spring of 1983, a large landslide occurred near the town of Thistle, Utah which 
blocked major transportation routes and impounded the Spanish Fork River, inundating the town with 
200 feet of water. While much attention has been given to the slide and its impact, very little has 
been directed toward a quantitative understanding of its causes. An analysis was performed of the 
Thistle landslide using the SEEPSLOPE finite element system in order to evaluate the mechanisms, 
factors, and causes of the failure. An elastic, perfectly-plastic stress-strain curve was employed 
in the analysis to model the behavior of the overconsolidated clay soils. It is concluded that the 
landslide was a compound, progressive failure which initiated at the toe and progressed uphill. Seep-
age forces played a significant role in the failure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Early in April 1983, motorists driving through 
Spanish Fork Canyon south of Provo, Utah, began 
noticing cracks in the road near the small town 
of Thistle. During the next few days, the 
cracks enlarged, the road began to heave, and 
the nearby railroad tracks began to be distorted. 
By the 14th of April, the Thistle landslide, a 
Quaternary earthflow deposit lying in a small 
canyon essentially perpendicular to the road, 
had moved sufficiently to lift the highway, 
sever the railroad, and block the Spanish Fork 
River. Within 30 days, this blockage had filled 
the canyon to a height of over 200 feet, butres-
sing against a large sandstone formation known 
locally as Billies Mountain. The small town of 
Thistle was buried with 62000 acre feet of water. 
Property damage triggered a Presidential Disas-
ter declaration. Opening a passageway for the 
Spanish Fork River and rebuilding transportation 
lines through the canyon subsequently cost local 
government and private entities in excess of 
200 million dollars. The question of what to do 
with the slide mass is still unanswered. In 
addition, severe hardships were imposed on the 
displaced residents of the small town who as of 
early 1987 had not been compensated for the loss 
of their property. 
This mass of overconsolidated clay, over a mile 
long and several hundred feet wide, has moved 
several times previously in geologic time, and 
has plagued the railroad lines for most of this 
century with occassional track movements due to 
creep. Deformation had been noted by some 
during the early Spring of 1983 which was attri-
buted to the wet weather conditions. Precipi-
tation during the winter of 1982-1983 had 
reached record levels, resulting in abnormally 
high antecedent moisture conditions. However, a 
movement of this magnitude had not been experi-
enced in recorded time. 
The geotechnical aspects of the Thistle land-
slide are complex and varied, and have been 
treated only qualitatively in previous studies. 
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This study was undertaken to quantitatively 
address the geotechnical mechanisms involved in 
the occurance of the Thistle Landslide. The 
objective was to use a finite element stability 
analysis to draw conclusions about the physical 
causes and mode of the failure which occurred 
there. Evidence is presented which demonstrates 
that the slide was a progressive failure in over-
consolidated clays which started at the toe of 
the slide and progressed uphill. High seepage 
forces played a significant role. in the failure. 
BACKGROUND 
The area of the slide is near the easternmost 
edge of the Middle Rocky Mountain Province which 
is characterized by generally high mountain 
ranges and plateaus transected by deeply incised 
erosional valleys. The toe of the slide in ·the 
bottom of the canyon was at an elevation of 
about 5030. The slide extended west approxi-
mately perpendicular to Spanish Fork Canyon a 
horizontal distance of 1200 feet, and then 
southwest another 4500 feet, reaching an eleva-
tion of about 5900 at the top. A twenty-foot 
scarp at the top is noticable, and several re-
lated slides adjacent to the main slide mass are 
also evident. Total slide widths vary from 
about 850 feet at the top to 1200 feet just 
above the bend. Below the bend, widths are 
slightly less than 1000 feet (Duncan et al., 
1985). The volume of landslide material in the 
canyon has been estimated to be between 3 and 
6.5 million cubic yards (FEMA, 1983; Dames and 
Moore, 1985; Kaliser and Fleming, 1986). Total 
volumes involved in the landslide are generally 
considered to be about 25 to 30 million cubic 
yards. 
Descriptions of the geology of the Thistle area 
are given by Witkind and Page (1983), Duncan, et 
al. (1985), and Kaliser and Fleming (1986). 
According to these sources, three formations 
underlie or are present as outcrops adjacent to 
the landslide. The Triassic Ankareh Formation, 
which is a weak, reddish, shaly siltstone and 
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sandstone underlies the Triassic-Jurassic 
Nugget sandstone, a strong, light colored sand-
stone which in turn underlies the Tertiary 
North Horn Formation, a weak, partly alluvial 
partly lacustrine deposit consisting of mud-
stone, claystone, sandstone, conglomerate, and 
liNestone. The valley in which the Thistle 
landslide rests was cut from the Ankareh Forma-
tion which completely underlies the landslide 
and is exposed an the north boundary of the 
landslide. The. Nugget Formation farms the 
prominent ridge that delineates the southeast 
flank of the landslide and underlies the land-
slide in the canyon bottom. Duncan, et al. 
(1985) concluded that "all movement of the 
Thistle landslide apparently was above this 
bedrock unit." The North Horn Formation is 
exposed along ridges an both the southeast and 
northwest borders of the landslide. The 
majority of the landslide is composed of debris 
and earthflaw material derived from the North 
Horn Formation. 
The Thistle landslide is an early Holcene 
(Kaliser and Fleming, 1986) landslide mass that 
has moved on several accassions in geologic 
time (Schroder, 1971 and Duncan, et al., 1985). 
However, Duncan, et al. (1985) argue that there 
was "no evidence that these alder, deep-seated 
landslides, should they be present, were active 
during 1983 or later." 
In approximately 115 years of historic records, 
there is no indication of massive movement of 
the Thistle slide, and no available written 
accounts of small movement (Kaliser and Fleming, 
1986). However, the slide has caused repeated 
problems to the rail lines located at. its toe 
(FEMA, 1983; Sumsion, 1983). The most recent 
report of troublesome movements dates to just 
two months before the catastrophic failure of 
1983. 
PHYSICAL DETAILS OF THE FAILURE 
Opinions differ about when the 1983 movement of 
the Thistle Landslide began. Kaliser &'7.Fieming, 
(1986) report that in January of 1983 an offi-
cial of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road reported cracks an the cut slope immedi-
ately west of the tracks which were "of size 
and depth far in excess of normal." These 
cracks apparently did nat extend upslope of the 
cut slope. In early March (Kaliser and Fleming, 
1986) , an inspection revealed that a set of 
cracks had advanced upslope a distance of about 
100 feet, but no material was noted on the in-
side track. Sumsion (1983, p. 12), showed a 
photograph taken April 2 of an active slump on 
the surface of the railroad cut at the toe of 
the landslide. Tension cracks parallel to and 
upslope from the railroad cut can be clearly 
seen in the photograph. 
The earliest official records of the Thistle 
Landslide are dated April 13, 1983. At 7:30 
a.m. on that day, Denver & Rio Grande western 
Railroad personnel reported that their tracks 
were out of alignment (Sumsian, 1983; Duncan 
et al., 1985). As the tracks continued to 
heave, the railroad attempted to keep the tracks 
open. Late that evening, heave was noted along 
the road surface of u.s. Highway 6 and 89, which 
lay about 200 feet east of the tracks and across 
the Spanish Fork River. By the afternoon of 
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April 14, vertical deformation of the highway 
surface was so severe that the road was closed 
to traffic, and an the following day, the road 
had displaced approximately 10 vertical feet 
(Dames and Moore, 1985). On the evening of 
April 15, the last train used the tracks 
(Kaliser and Fleming, 1986). 
From the first signs of movement considerable 
effort was applied to prevent the Spanish Fork 
River from being dammed and to keep the canyon 
open. By April 17, it was clear that these 
efforts were failing and the residents of 
Thistle were evacuated. At this time efforts 
had already turned to unloading what was thought 
to be the "head" of the slide, in the area imme-
diately upslope from the railroad cut. Attention 
also turned to preventing overtopping of the dam 
by the new Lake Thistle, and evaluating new 
transportation routes. On April 22, Utah Gover-
nor Scott Matheson declared the area a state 
disaster area, and on April 30, President Ron-
ald Reagan made the Thistle slide area Utah's 
first National Disaster Area. 
Movement of the slide was measured by Railroad 
and county crews during the first crucial weeks 
of sliding. According to Duncan et al. (1985), 
the Railroad reported that the landslide was 
moving at about 0.75 feet per hour on April 14. 
This average rate increased to a maximum of 2.5 
to 2.8 feet per hour during the period of April 
17 to 19, and declined to 0.80 feet per hour by 
April 25. Total horizontal displacement for the 
bottom of the slide during this period is esti-
mated to be about 500 feet. Vertical displace-
ments Of up to 1.5 feet per hour were noted 
(Dames and Moore, 1985). Peak sliding rates 
measured by Utah County were on the order of 
6.6 feet per hour on April 19. 
Ry the beginning of May, slide movement had 
largely halted because of the accumulation of 
slide debris in the valley and the buttressing 
effects of Billies Mountain. 
ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
An analysis of the Thistle failure was performed 
using the SEEPSLOPE finite element system which 
consists of two component codes, CFLOW and WOOD-
LUND. CFLOW is a code which calculates steady 
state flow through nonhomogeneous media (Taylor 
and Brown, 1967). WOODLUND is a stress analysis 
program far plane strain conditions originally 
developed to analyze underground openings in 
rock (Chang and Nair, 1973). It employs an 
elastic-perfectly plastic stress-strain formu-
lation using a Drucker-Prager yield criterion. 
These twa programs were combined and enhanced by 
the Bureau Of Mines (Corp, Schuster, and McDon-
ald, 1975} to analyze mine tailing impoundments. 
SEEPSLOPE computations for the Thistle analysis 
were performed on a Gould 9080 minicomputer at 
the University of Utah College of Engineering. 
Details of the implementation of SEEPSLOPE are 
given by Leonard (1987). 
An initial finite element mesh was fashioned 
which consisted of 1160 nodes and 1048 elements 
along an axis approximating the centerline of 
the slide. The mesh is 5800 feet long and rela· 
tively shallow, as is necessary to model the 
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actual failure. Thicknesses vary from 180 feet 
at the top to 265 feet at the middle, to 480 
feet near the bottom. Topography is based on 
USGS Quadrangle maps and post-slide topographic 
maps prepared by the Utah County Engineer's Of-
fice. 
Elements at the head of the slide were initially 
100 feet long by about 30 feet high. Elements 
in the middle of the slide were reduced to 50 
feet long and about 35 feet high. In the lower 
portion of the slide, elements were further re-
duced to 33 feet long by about 30 feet high. 
The majority of the elements are rectangular, 
although some triangular elements were included 
as needed to accommodate the physical boundaries 
and mesh transitions. The CFLOW program uses 
this initial mesh together with an estimate of 
the phreatic surface to perform seepage calcu-
lations. As CFLOW moves the nodes which lie on 
the phreatic surface to satisfy continuity of 
flow, the remainder of the mesh is distorted 
accordingly and element sizes vary. 
The finite element mesh was divided into four 
soil types, representing the primary strata en-
countered on the site. Material parameters used 
in the analysis were based on data from inves-
tigations performed at the site of the slide 
under the direction of the Utah State Division 
of Water Rights and the Utah County Engineer 
(Duncan, et.al., 1985). While four principal 
soil types were identified for analysis pur-
poses, there was significant spacial variability 
in the materials encountered at the site. 
Very little is known about the precise pre-slide 
hydraulic conditions in the slide mass. Perme-
abilities were estimated from post-slide tests. 
Various inflow and outflow nodes were selected 
in the CFLOW analysis to model infiltration and 
known springs within the slide area. The SEEP-
SLOPE program calculated a phreatic surface 
location and computed the corresponding seepage 
forces. 
For the stress analysis portion of the study, 
eight cases were developed, each with a slightly 
different set of soil parameters. The cases 
were designed to provide insight into the 
Thistle failure, since it was unlikely that any 
specific set of parameters would exactly model 
the actual conditions. Six of these cases used 
the full seepage forces computed by earlier por-
tions of the SEEPSLOPE system. For the other 
two cases, seepage forces were reduced by one-
half (J-1) or one-quarter (k-1) for all nodes 
within or above the zone of failure. This was 
done in an attempt to compensate for the assump-
tions of steady-state seepage and fully satura-
ted conditions which the SEEPSLOPE system made. 
:The transient conditions 1.and '.partially satura-
ted soil zones above the phreatic furface be-
lieved to exist prior to the slide would yield 
lower seepage forces than computed by the 
steady-s~ate analysis performed by SEEPSLOPE. 
The materials in the slide were predominantly 
stiff overconsolidated clays with many fissures 
and zones of high permeability. The strength 
of these materials also exhibited significant 
spatial variation. While there was undoubtably 
some minor excess pore pressure buildup during 
the failure, the analysis was performed using 
effective stress methods and drained conditions 
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which are more appropriate for slopes in stiff 
fissured materials (Lambe .. & Whitman, 1969), 
The strength parameters for the materials which 
participated in the slide are shown in Table 1. 
vfuile there was considerable variation in the 
measured values of friction angle and cohesion 
(Leonard, 1987), there were data which suggested 
that the upper 50 feet was slightly weaker than 
the underlying materials. Accordingly, the top 
row of elements was designated as soil 1 while 
the remainder of the material above the clay-
stone and sandston~ bedrock was designated as 
soil 2. 
TABLE 1. soil Strength Parameters for Soils 1 
and 2 for Each Case of WOODLUND 
Stress/Stability Analysis 
Soil 1 Soil 2 
phi c phi c 
(deg) (psi) (deg) (psi) 
Case I-14 11.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 
Case I-15 27.4 0.0 27.4 o.o 
Case I-16 11.0 106.0 9.0 106.0 
Case I-17 11.0 122.0 9.0 122,0 
Case I-18 20.0 33.3 20.0 47.8 
Case I-19 20.0 122.0 20.0 122.0 
Case J-1 11.0 122.0 9.0 122.0 
Case K-1 11.0 122.0 9.0 122.0 
The first two cases represent the pure residual 
shear strength condition. Duncan et al. (1985) 
theorized that "antecedent movements had proba-
bly reduced the strength along the sides and 
base of the slide to residual frictional values~ 
In such a case, the stress strain curve would 
have no peak, but would level off at the resi-
dual value. In addition, the cohesion intercept 
would be zero. Case I~l4 uses the lowest resi-
dual friction angle measured on Thistle samples 
in the laboratory. Case I-15 represents the 
highest angles measured. 
Even in circumstances where residual shear stre-
ngths generally govern stress-strain behavior, 
small peak strengths are sometimes developed 
over time due to thixotropy. In addition, por-
tions of a slide which do not contain. previous 
failure surfaces will exhibit peak strengths 
before dropping to residual levels. In order to 
model these conditions the soil parameters used 
in case I-16 were modified to include a cohesion 
intercept. An unconfined compression test value 
of 106 psi was selected for use as a cohesion 
value, representing the second highest such 
value noted in the test data. A relatively high 
value was selected in order to insure stable 
results. Preliminary analyses had indicated 
that lower cohesion values would yield a totally 
unstable slide mass. 
Case I-17 uses sligh.tly higher cohesion values 
in an attempt to bracket the true failure conai-
tion~~t. 
Case. I-18 represents the average frictional and 
cohesion shear l!!trength parameters from the 
laboratory data. 1!\bt a true residual strength. 
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case, b'lis set of data reflects a buildup of sone peak 
strength due to thi.J<Otropy ot unsheared soils with dia-
genetic bonding. lhe cohesion values are different for 
the two soils, reflecting the difference between the 
average unconfined COI!pression values for soils shallower 
than 40 feet and deeper than 40 feet. 
case i-19 is intended to p=vide sone c:onparati'lte infor-
· .. rration relative to the other cases. This case uses the 
sarre cohesion intercept as I-17, but with a high& f:tic-
:±i,orL~le. ·. :(:t also uses the sane friction angle as 
I-18, but with higher cohesions. The sensitivity of the 
stress analysis with respect to these two soil pararreters 
•..can be evaluated using the results of this and the two 
previous cases. In addition, this COI!bination of para-
rreters fonns an upper bound on the strength envelopes 
used for the analysis. 
'!he last two cases use the sane strength pararreters as 
case I-19, but with reduced seepage forces. For case 
J-1, seepage forces above the assurred failure surface 
were reduced to one-half of their original values. For 
case K-1, nodal seepage forces were reduced to one-quar-
:ter of their original levels for this case. 
Each of the cases analyzed had sone failed elarents 
which led to redistribution of stresses during the 
calculations. These redistributions were successful in 
converging to a solution in all cases except I-14 and 
I -15. In these two cases corrg;>Uted stress levels were so 
high relative to soil strengths that nearly every ele-
rrent yielded in early load incrercents. In successive 
COI!pUter iterations, stresses were transferred back and 
forth between yielded elerrents and convergence toward 
a solution could not occur. 
In all of the other cases a solution was P=duoed with 
elerrents at or near failure clustered at or near the 
bottom of the slope. Only case I-18 with lower cohesion 
failed elerrents higher than app=xirrately one-third of 
the way up the slope. In this case only the upper 
approxirrately one-fourth of the rresh was stable. 
In order to better oonpare the various analyzed cases 
and nore fully evaluate the stability COIIputations for 
the 'lhistle landslide, average factors of safety were 
carputed for seven trial failure surfaces using data 
f=m each analysis case. The seven failure surfaces 
were selected specifically to aid in the understanding 
of the nature of the failure. Weighted average factors 
of safety were COI!pUted for each of the seven failure 
. surfaces for each of the WCODLUND cases described above. 
Results of these COI!putations are shown in Table 2. 
Although the total length of the landslide is known to 
be about 5700 feet, the depth and shape of the failure 
surface is still in question, and it is tmelear whether 
the slide is Itade up of one long failure mass or many 
Sllall oonpound failures. 
Failure surface 1 represents the full length failure, 
based on the theo:cy that the slide was a long, shallow, 
a:>ntinuous failure mass. Surface 2 also represents a 
relatively long, shallow landslide mass, but extends 
only one-third the length of the total slide, and does 
not conpletely c=ss the canyon floor. Failure Sur-
face 3 is much shorter, and approaches the shape of a 
circular failure. Failure Surface 4 was developed to 
evaluate the validity of a deep failure. Sone have 
postulated that the 'lhistle landslide involved a deep 
failure which lifted the highway in the canyon floor. 
Surface 5 is a small, shallow, nearly circular failure. 
Surfaces 6 and 7 represent small, localized failures of 
the landslide. A srrall failure of this sort could be 
triggered by weather conditions or construction activity, 
and rray lead to a larger, p=gressive failure event. 
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TABLE 2. Factors of Safety for selected Failure Surfaces 
Failure Surface Number 
case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I-14 0.33 0.22 0.55 0.84 0.72 0.67 0.57 
I-15 0.58 0.62 1.05 0.96 1.42 1.88 1.88 
I-16 6.14 7.87 1.57 1.71 1.09 1.63 1.33 
I-17 6.85 8.95 1.74 1.89 1.30 1.80 1.39 
I-18 2.55 0.73 0.81 1.05 1.05 1.27 1.31 
I-19 6.92 9.16 1.95 2.09 1.46 1.98 1.63 
J-1 6.83 7.20 4.24 3.57 2.07 1.87 1.45 
K-1 7.40 9.24 2.78 2.50 1.70 1.91 1.44 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Sufficient data about the Thistle pre-slide groundwater 
conditions are not available to accurately nodel the 
variable transient conditions and resulting forces. In 
general, the phreatic surface COI!pUted by SEEPSIDPE seems 
realistic in its location and shape. Nodal seepage 
forces, however, are probably higher than they should be. 
Without the availability of !lOre detailed infoJ:lllation, 
arbitrarily reducing seepage forces above the failure 
surface is a sinple rrethod for app=ximating the tran-
sient a:>ndi tions. seepage forces were cut to one-half 
and one-quarter their original levels and the effects of 
those lowered forces studied in the stress analysis por-
tion of this research. The effectiveness of this approach 
is derronstrated in two sets of relationships. First, it 
was evident in the distribution of failed elenents in 
cases I-19, J-1, and K-1 that the number of failed ele-
rrents in the analyses with reduced forces is less than in 
I -19, particularly in the shallower elerrents. Since the 
seepage forces were reduced in these cases for elenents 
above the p=posed failure zone, this result is expected. 
second, sone trends can be seen in the factors of safety 
for the trial failure surfaces. Conparing case J-1 with 
I -19, the decreased seepage forces yield higher or es-
sentially equal factors of safety for five of the seven 
failure surfaces. The average increase in factor of 
safety is 27 percent. COnparing case K-1 with J-1, higher 
or equivalent factors of safety are yielded for four of 
five surfaces. The factors of safety for Surfaces 6 and 
7 rerrain =ughly unchanged in all three cases. This would 
have relatively low seepage forces • 
SEEPSIDPE was not able to carpute realistic factors of 
safety for cases I-14 and I-15 which did not converge. 
'Ihe specific results of these two cases I!RlSt be generally 
disregarded, except as they relate to the overall failure 
parameters of the Thistle slide. The results of these 
two cases indicate that 'Ihistle was not strictly a re-
currance of an old slide along a previously failed sur-
face. Elerrent factors of safety were so unifonnly low 
that transfer of excess stresses could not be accan-
plished. Even the high friction angle used in case I-15 
was not sufficient to bring about stability. Based on 
this information, it is likely that sone peak strengths 
were involved in the failure. 
All of the cases analyzed clearly indicate that the slide 
initiated at the toe. Even when large numbers of elerrents 
are yielded, as in case I-18, factors of safety near the 
head are consistently greater than one. As the number of 
yielded elerrents decreases, they tend to be located pri-
marily at the toe. 'Ibis observation is st=ngly supported 
by the failure surface factors of safety. Disregarding 
cases I-14 and I-15, Failure Surfaces 1 and 2 never have 
the lowest factors of safety for a given case. In addi-
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tion, in five of the six cases, the factors of safety for 
these tw:l surfaces are considerable higher than those for 
:the other surfaces. 
Tension cracking noted in a photograph taken ten days 
before the slide began supports the argurrent that sliding 
began at the toe. It has been suggested (Duncan, et al., 
1985) that it was unclear whether events at the toe or 
the head were rore inp:>rtant in the initiation of sli-
ding. Evidence from this study clearly indicates other-
wise; the slide began at the toe. 
With full seepage loads applied, the rost stable result 
is yielded in case I -19. The distribution of yielded 
elements clearly shows fewer yielded elements in this 
case than in the other cases using a· full seepage load. 
'!he failure surface factor of safety results also support 
this observation. Fbr ~y given failure surface, case 
I-19 yields a higher factor of safety then the others. 
Two observations can be drawn about the shape of the 
failure surface based on results of trial failure sur-
face COIIputations. First, the failure was not a deep 
seated circular failure. Am:mg the six converging cases, 
the minimuin factor of safety was associated with Failure 
Surface 5 in three of the cases and with Failure Surface 
7 in tw:l of the cases. Surface 5 is a very shallow, 
circular surface, and Surface 7 is a superficial 
sloughing failure of the toe. Failure Surface 4, the 
deep seated failure, never yields the lowest factor of 
safety. Second, the failure did not involve a long, 
continuous surface. Failure Surface 1 yields the highest 
aggregate factor of safety in each of the six cases. 
Relatively high cohesion values were required to achieve 
convergence and stability in the various analyses. Cases 
involving low cohesion values, such as I-18, resulted in 
nunerous yielded elerrents and low factors of safety on 
the trial failure surfaces. · Fbur of the seven surfaces 
had factors of safety near or below one in case I -18. 
None of the failure surfaces analyzed yielded factors of 
safety less than one in cases I -17 and I-19. '!he co-
hesion value used in these tw:l cases was 122 psi, repre-
senting the highest value obtained in the laboratory 
£rem unconfined COitpression tests. Since significant 
cohesion was required to achieve stability, it seems 
likely that soil strengths nobilized during the slide 
were higher than residual levels. 
Only small increases in stability were obtained by in-
creasing the friction angle. Cortparison of Cases I-17 
and I -19 de!ronstrates that for an 82 pereent increase in 
friction angle, only a 9 percent increase in factor of 
safety resulted. The conpa.rison of Cases I-16 and I-17 
and Cases I-18 and I-19, however, derronstrate the sensi-
tivity of the analysis to the cohesion parazreter. Case 
I-17 used a 15 percent higher cohesion value than I-17, 
with a resulting increase in factor of safety of 11 per-
cent. case I-19 used a cohesion value averaging 310 per-
cent higher than case I-18, with a resulting increase in 
factor of safety of 340 percent. 
Definite trends relating to the developnent of a conp:nmd 
failure surface are not evident in the results of this 
study. H<:ll\'ever, the observations that yielded elements 
are always canoentrated at the toe of the slide, and 
long, continuous failure surfaces always have high fac-
tors of safety indicates that the failure as a cxxrpound 
pmgressive failure. Conputed failure surfaces with low 
factors of safety are generally smrt, but the actual 
failure was quite long. It seems reasonable that small 
zones could fail near the toe of the slide, resulting in 
the rencval of the resisting forces supporting higher 
elements, ult:inately causing similar small failures of 
uphill areas. In this way, the failure would gradually 
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progress up the hill. For instance, in case I-16, the 
minimum factor of safety is for the short, shallow Fail-
ure Surface 5. With a factor of safety of 1.09, this 
surface is near failure. Once this mass of elements 
fails and the support is renoved from the mass above 
Failure Surface 3, it is likely that Surface 3 will 
approach instability. With the re.roval of elements n~ 
the canyon bottan, excess stresses would be passed to 
elements higher on the slide, and lower factors of safety 
would result. SUch a scenario supports the corrpound 
failure theo:cy. 
CX>NCLUSIONS AND RECXM1ENDATICNS 
Several conclusions can be drawn fran this study of the 
'Ihistle Landslide based on the results presented and 
considerations discussed. 'l'hey are as follows: 
1. The 'lhistle Slide was not a sinple recurrance of a 
pre-existing slide acting 100lely at residual shear 
strength levels. It appears to be a ca:cp:>und pro-
gressive failure with peak strengths nobilizing in 
many of the soil zones. While ancient slides have 
occurred at this location and soma of those failure 
surfaces may have been reactivated in 1983, the ma-
jority of the failure surface appears to have been in 
previously llllfailed material. If this were not so, 
stability could be seen in those cases involving 
residual. strength parazreters. 
2. Analyses perforned in this study indicate that the 
slide started at the toe and progressed ll};tli.ll. 
3. '!he failure did not involve a deep-seated, circular 
failure surface or a long, continuous failure sur-
face. It is rore likely that relatively shallow 
masses of soil failed, progressively triggering 
failures in adjacent, uphill zones. 
4. Seepage forces played a significant role in the fail-
ure at 'lhistle. As suggested by previous investi-
gators of the Thistle. Slide, water in the soil re-
sulting from high precipitation levels was definitely 
a factor contributing to this failure. 
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